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WHEN PROOF IS NOT ENOUGH
AN OTTOMAN MERCHANT IN THE GIBRALTAR
VICE-ADMIRALTY COURT IN THE 1760S
This article examines the litigation of an Ottoman merchant based in
Algiers in the vice-admiralty court of Algiers in 1760. It examines the impor-
tance of legal proofs for merchants traversing the Mediterranean world, and
the ability of such merchants to record transactions and interactions along
the way, as well as to subsequently call on witnesses from near and far. The
case examined here sees documents compiled in Italian, Spanish, Arabic, and
English, constructing a solid legal case, which was rejected by the British on
the grounds of setting a precedent and privileging a «Moor» over a British
subject. This then raises the question of the validity of proofs in different
Mediterranean settings, with the Ottoman merchant’s diverse and thorough
documentation rejected in Gibraltar when it would have been entirely ad-
missible in another legal setting.
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xIntroduction
The study of merchants often centres on the disputes in which they
found themselves; after all, problems generate paperwork. The early
modern Mediterranean, a mix of different languages, cultures, polit-
ies, and legal systems, generated plenty of legal disagreements between
merchants from a variety of backgrounds. This article aims to explore
what happened to an Ottoman subject based in Algiers when things
went wrong for him in the Western Mediterranean, and who sought re-
dress in the British vice-admiralty court of Gibraltar. It is an exceptional
case in many ways, but indicative of a growing number of unsuccess-
ful litigations of North African and Ottoman merchants in European
courts, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century. This
case is important in a number of ways, and although it is difficult to
draw broader conclusions from just one example, it provides evidence
of key themes that I am developing in a broader piece of writing on this
subject. It demonstrates the importance of written legal proofs to this
particular Ottoman merchant, and gives him a voice that is often lack-
ing from historical investigations into the Ottomans and North Africa.
It also demonstrates the limits of interculturality when it came to com-
peting legal systems, specifically the limits set by Britain from a mer-
cantilist and protectionist perspective. In her seminal study on the early
modern Mediterranean, Fusaro cautions us «not to fall into the trap
of anachronism» in thinking too deeply about the nation state in this
earlier period, yet she shows us convincingly that the imposition of state
interest was crucial in assuring the success of commercial interest for
states like Britain. The evident self-interest pursued by the judge at the
British vice-admiralty court in Gibraltar in the case that follows, even
at the expense of due process that would be expected across the water
in Algiers, is indicative of the growing encroachment of a dominant
and exploitative European economic system that saw the North African
Regencies increasingly – and increasingly violently – peripheralised1.
Earnest investigations into questions of legal proof and commercial
litigation in the early modern Mediterranean often suffer from a lack of
coherent documentation. The accidence of the survival of the sources,
particularly when dealing with texts and scraps of paper that may not
have been retained by state archives or court records, is particularly
problematic in reconstructing the materiality of proof. To find a com-
plete set of case documents of legal proofs for an eighteenth-century
commercial case is therefore lamentably rare2. Fortunately, The Na-
tional Archives in London hold just such a bundle of papers relating,
even more unusually, to an Ottoman subject based in Algiers. Much of
the historiography on Ottoman Algiers focuses on slaves, naval forces,
and pious endowments, meaning that a focus on Algerian merchants
(broadly defined) and especially Algerian merchants outside of Algiers
is missing3. As a very small means of showing the potential wealth in
European archives concerning Algerian and other Ottoman merchants,
and to examine the limits of interculturality – that is, the point at which
one particular system was privileged or privileged itself to the expense of
others – in terms of legal proofs in the Mediterranean commercial world
of the eighteenth century, this paper will examine the documentation
this particular individual presented to the British Vice-Admiralty court
in Gibraltar in the mid-1760s. In the introduction to an interesting set of
papers on interculturality, Salhia Ben-Messahel describes the dynamics
of interculturality as being «a violation of the frontier separating cultur-
al microcosms [that] creates an intercultural dialogue whose objective
is to take into account diversity and the hybrid character of the modern
world»4. The relationship between interculturality and frontierness is
important in the context of encounters in the Western Mediterranean,
not least, to borrow the words of Maria Fusaro, because space in that
sea was characterised by a number of explicitly permeable frontiers, not
simply in terms of the movement of people and goods, but in terms of
the movement of legal norms and practices5.
Yet if the frontiers were already permeable, then what might con-
stitute a violation of such border? Rather, it would seem, there were
zones within which interculturality functioned through large and wide
webs with nodes in different political, legal, religious, and linguistic
contexts, and there were zones that privileged certain contexts over
others. This is something that we see in the interactions between North-
ern Europeans and Algerians/Ottomans in the Western Mediterranean
and beyond. In the case under examination, the British were active
participants in what we might term an intercultural zone, although I am
still torn as to what this actually means in this context. If we take the
idea of interculturality in relation to a series of contacts, relationships,
or connections, or a form of fluidity, then we are perhaps missing the
point of what was going on6? What was at stake? Was this a space of
the interaction of separate and perhaps even competing cultures of law
and commerce, or, to take the idea of Thierry Fabre, a creolised space
both of and between these cultures that created a particular kind of
localised hegemony7? From examining a number of cases, of which the
following is exceptional in its detail but indicative in its outcome, it
would seem that a European assessment of Algerian justice as corrupt
was in fact more applicable to the justice of the British vice-admiralty
court. The boundaries of the intercultural space of which the subject
of our case-study was a good example were formed by the national
interest of the Northern Europeans. This article attempts, on the one
hand, to show the breadth of paperwork gathered from around the
Mediterranean to support our particular merchant’s case, and on the
other to seek to understand why, despite this, his claims at the British
vice-admiralty court failed8.
xOttoman and Algerian law
The French diplomat Laugier de Tassy’s oeuvre on the history,
politics, and commerce of Algiers published in 1725 was a rather suc-
cessful publication, being published in a number of editions and trans-
lated into Spanish, Dutch, and English9. His observations at the begin-
ning of chapter ten of the second book, entitled, De la Justice Civille et
Criminelle, deserve some attention.
Justice, in both civil and criminal cases, is administered here without
delay, without documents, without charges, and without appeals, whether it
be by the Dey, the qadi, the kahya, or the reis of the navy. And in contested
cases, the only delay is in the necessary time to go to find witnesses, if there
are not other sufficient proofs10.
It is representative of the supposed arbitrary nature of Algerian
justice, as would befit its status as a «pirate state». The administration
of justice, according to Laugier de Tassy, was swift, final, and, crucially,
lacking in écritures, written proofs. He reiterates this when speaking
about the procedures for hearing cases of debt in Algiers, that écrits were
hardly used. Such a notion of an unsophisticated and almost tyrannical
nature of the Algerian legal system has been sustained in what one
might call the «Barbary historiography», a profoundly Eurocentric set
of writings that cannot even begin to imagine that Algiers might have
operated in a rather different manner to that described in contemporary
European accounts11. Even a brief examination of the correspondence
of the deys, the records of the qadis, and the records of the European
consulates, reveals a series of legal systems with different (although
sometimes overlapping) jurisdictions, all of which relied, at least in
part on written records. At the basic level was what one might term
the confessional courts, those of the qadis, priests, and rabbis, as well
as those of the European consuls who held similar rights over their
subjects and protégées resident in Algiers. Indeed, the importance of
consuls in ensuring commercial functions, in the Ottoman and North
African realms as well as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, cannot be
understated, providing legal support and advice within an intertwined
diplomatic and commercial framework12. In case of interfaith litigation,
particularly between foreigners and Algerian Muslims, cases were heard
at the court of the dey, comprised of him and his dīvān, in the presence
of the relevant consul and his translators.
Such a system was set out clearly in the treaties signed between
Algiers and foreign powers. If we take the British of 1686, for example,
the treaty states:
English text: Artic. 15 That the subjects of his said Majestie in Algiers,
or its Territories, in matter of Controversie, shall be liable to no other Jur-
isdiction but that of the Dey or Divan, except that they happen to be at
difference between themselves, in which case they shall be liable to no other
determination but that of the Consul onely13.
Ottoman Turkish text: The fifteenth section that has been accorded and
resolved is, that if a person from among the subjects of the British king engages
in litigation with a Muslim or with a person subject to Algiers, it is to be
judged by His Highness [the Dey] or the dīvān, and not by any other person.
And if there is litigation amongst themselves, in that event the individual who
is the British consul shall judge the case, and no other person14.
Similarly, in the treaties between the Ottoman sultan – Algiers’s
nominal sovereign lord – and foreign powers, there is a clear process for
litigation involving mixed cases, slightly different in nature, however, in
being far more reliant on textual proofs, and far more flexible in terms
of jurisdiction. In articles 9, 10, 15 and 16 of the British Capitulations
of 1675, it is specifically stated that:
[9] The British and [their] dependents being resident in the Well-Pro-
tected Domains with their merchants, gentlemen, translators, and brokers
desiring to buy and sell, give and trade, in the event of particular sureties
and other legal matters, may go to the judge [who] can give a proof [and]
write it in the register. If there are any subsequent disputes, the proof and
register can be examined. If their claim is conformable to the proof, let action
be taken in accordance with the legal proof. [10] And if there is no proof
from the judges, only the producing of a false witness, the claims may not
be heard. The enforcement of the law will always be in accordance with the
legal proof. [...] [15] The British and their dependents having legal claims,
litigations, and other legal matters, [and] their translators or agents not be-
ing present, the judges of legal claims may not hear or judge [upon them].
[16] The disputes among the British shall be seen by their ambassadors and
consuls. The judges and any other of my slave officials shall not interfere,
[and] they may never rule on their practices and customs, nor on their dis-
putes15.
Although the Algerian treaty articles do not explicitly discuss the
role of written proofs in such cases, the fact that this structure was
deliberately enshrined in successive treaties agreed to by both parties
means that there was an implicit acceptance that the legal processes
of the dey’s courts were capable and fair, comparable to other arrange-
ments in the Mediterranean such as earlier Venetian-Mamluk agree-
ments16. Moreover, the significance attached to legal proofs and specific
jurisdictions within the Ottoman capitulations also gives us an insight
into the legal culture that prevailed in Algiers. The statement of the
1675 British Capitulations that the enforcement of the law will always
be in accordance with the written legal proof – dāʾimā hüccet-i şerʿiye
muḳtażāsınca icrā-yı ḥaḳḳ oluna – is a testament to the importance of
written proofs within the broad Ottoman legal system. As well as relying
on oral testimonies and decision-making processes, it was also a system
based on record-keeping, receipts, and register; in short, contrary to
Laugier de Tassy, it was a system of écrits.
This was certainly the case for European merchants resident in
Algiers, but what about the situation for Algerian merchants trading
abroad? A number of the articles of treaties between Algiers and for-
eign powers contained reciprocal clauses, so did the Algerian author-
ities expect a similar degree of reciprocity in case of legal disputes in
European courts? It is worth dwelling on why this question has not
been asked. The literature on commercial litigation within the wider
Mediterranean is slowly growing, but Ottoman North Africans, and
Ottomans in general, are missing17. In part this might be a chronological
issue; Daniel Panzac pointed to the first decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury as the moment that North African merchants and shipping began
to arrive in Mediterranean ports, following the demise of corsairing as a
major activity18. It may also be that there has simply not been sufficient
studies on both sides of the Ottoman-European relationships, in order
to view commerce «all of a piece»19. Yet, with some digging, one finds
Ottoman and North African merchants, and their factors, across the
Mediterranean in the second half of the eighteenth century. In part, the
absence of such individuals has to do with the source base; searching
for Ottoman or North African litigants in European commercial courts
is far from easy. Beyond this, however, it is perhaps due to the fact that
many of the documents surrounding such cases, rare as they may be,
are in a variety of languages, including Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Itali-
an, and Spanish. Bundles of multilinguistic scribbles are often ignored.
But in a large part it seems to be that, with all the focus being on the
litigations of European merchants in the wider Ottoman realms, and
on the impact of piracy and corsairing on European commerce in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the fate of Algerian and Ottoman
merchants who got into trouble at sea has simply not been of interest
to a one-sided narrative. At the same time, the courts where such litig-
ations might occur, the admiralty and vice-admiralty courts (and their
equivalents) in Britain, France, and the Netherlands, have also received
short-shrift in the historiography20.
xThe case of Giovanni Xeno
The bundle consists of twenty-five individual items signed off by
the plaintiff, Giovanni Xeno. This individual, who will be an integral
subject in a forthcoming monograph on Algerian merchants in com-
mercial dispute with European merchants and courts, was an Ottoman
Greek subject born on the isle of Patmos, but who seems to have spent
most of his working life in Algiers. His identity, therefore, is not clear.
From the mentions of his cases I have found in the Ottoman archives
in Istanbul, he is simply referred to either as a Rūm ẕimmī – a pro-
tected Ottoman non-Muslim of the Greek Orthodox confession – or
as a Devlet-i ʿAliye reʿāyā – a subject of the Sublime (i.e. Ottoman)
State21. Therefore, from the Ottoman perspective, he remained an Ot-
toman subject, not least because Algiers remained an Ottoman territ-
ory. Moreover, the British consul in Algiers, James Bruce, referred to
Xeno as «a Greek subject of the Grand Signor», thus fitting in with the
Ottoman definition22. As an Ottoman subject, he was therefore entitled
to the protection of the provisions of the Ottoman-British Capitulations
of 1675. Yet, at the same time, as a resident of Algiers working for Al-
gerian clients, he would have also been protected by the British treaties
with the Algerian Regency, most recently renewed in 1762 from the
perspective of this case. Both these treaties were commercial in nature,
with the specific aim of ensuring the smooth transaction of peaceful
commerce. However, such treaty protection was not brought into ac-
count when Xeno stepped before the British vice-admiralty court in
Gibraltar, and the purpose of this paper is to examine the documenta-
tion he brought to that court and the narratives they presented, and to
try to make sense of a legal judgement that did not consider his proofs
as valid.
The events that brought Giovanni Xeno to Gibraltar require a brief
narration, compiled from Xeno’s own account, the court documents,
and the summary of James Bruce23. Algiers was on the verge of a major
crisis owing to a series of failed harvests, part of a wider famine across
the Ottoman realms in the 1760s24. Consequently, the Dey of Algiers,
Baba ʿAli Pasha, came to an arrangement with Sultan Muhammad III
of Morocco to ship grain from the Moroccan ports, and tenders were
offered to Algerian merchants to take part in this project. This also
meant business for the ships of the French, Dutch, and British engaged
in freighting in the Western Mediterranean, an activity that had been
a crucial part of their presence in the Mediterranean since the later six-
teenth century25. One of the most prominent Algerian merchants of the
day, ʿAli Hoca, entered into an agreement with the Moroccan sultan’s
agent at Tetouan, Muhammed Ben-Taleb, facilitated by Giovanni Xeno
who would act as the supercargo. The role of the supercargo, a legal
category developed in the British context of the seventeenth century,
was to protect the interests of the merchants purchasing goods to be
freighted in port and on their journey, and as such, Xeno would travel
with the freight on behalf of ʿAli Hoca and Ben-Taleb26. The freight-
ing aspect of the deal was arranged on behalf of two merchants resid-
ent in Livorno, Lefroy (British of Huguenot descent) and Charron (a
French subject), through their agent in Algiers, Peter Cruise. As a ma-
jor commercial emporium and portofranco, Livorno served as a centre
of Mediterranean shipping, and Lefory and Charron provided ships
for numerous voyages for merchants going to and from Algiers27. The
chosen freighter was Patrick Hayes, an Irish subject of Britain, and his
ship the Experience. The contract was therefore made between Xeno
as supercargo and Cruise as broker, and the charter-party agreement
for freighting made between Hayes as captain and Cruise on behalf
of Charron & Lefroy. The contract stipulated that Hayes would be
paid within twenty days of discharging the cargo at Algiers, and that he
would follow all the instructions of Xeno in his capacity as supercargo,
a position that afforded him great power as well as responsibility.
FIG. 1. The contractual agreements for shipping wheat from Morocco to Algiers, 1763.
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Terms agreed, Hayes and Xeno set sail for the port of Mahdiya (also
called Mamora) in January 1764. Hayes, it transpires, had got himself
into a significant amount of debt in Livorno, and rumours abounded
that he had insured his ship multiple times with a view of wrecking it
off the North African coast and claiming insurance monies to cover his
debt, very likely an example of insurance fraud28. Indeed, Xeno claimed,
he tried to dispose of the ships cables and anchors before leaving, and
attempted to run aground off Majora, but failing this, he ended up
in Gibraltar. Xeno left to go to Tetouan to confirm the pick-up point
with Ben-Taleb, and instructed Hayes to meet him at Mahdiya, but
not to enter into the harbour, which was protected by a barrier that
made it difficult for larger ships to cross. Seeing a nice opportunity to
wreck the ship, Hayes attempted to cross the barrier in poor weather,
but the waves lifted him over and safely into the harbour. By the end
of April 1764, all the grain had been loaded onto the Experience, and
the sultan’s own pilot, Salha Reis was sent to Mahdiya to help guide
them over the port barrier; Hayes, however, refused to move, desiring
to delay the journey. Soon after this delay, Xeno fell gravely ill, and was
bed-ridden for several months, and, despite instructing Hayes to leave
under the guidance of the sultan’s pilot, the cargo remained in Mahdiya.
By August Salha Reis was required elsewhere, and he had gone by the
time Xeno recovered at the end of that month. With Xeno back, Hayes
tried to persuade him that it would be better to sell the grain in Spain,
where a higher price could be fetched; this would also negate the earlier
contract, removing any liability for the delay. Xeno, of course, refused,
and demanded that they go immediately to Algiers as planned, but
Hayes ignored him entirely and took him and the ship by force back
to Gibraltar. There, he met with several other Irish merchants – Peter
Cruise of Algiers and Michael Murphy and Francis Butler of Gibraltar
– and they conspired to sell the wheat. After again failing to persuade
Xeno to join them in their scheme, Hayes went to the Vice-Admiralty
Court and demanded immediate payment for his freighting charges
from Xeno or security for it, on the basis, he claimed, that half of the
cargo was rotten due to the time spent waiting at Mahdiya.
It is at this point, then that Xeno began collating and presenting
his evidence to the Vice-Admiralty Court. Some of the physical evid-
ence, notably the cargo, has not survived, although Xeno presented
a sample to the Court to prove that it was not rotten as Hayes had
claimed. However, the paperwork was compelling in proving the valid-
ity of the contract and the truth of Xeno’s narrative of events, and
this paperwork deserves some attention. There was an Italian declar-
ation dated 11 January 1764 registering the charter-party agreement
with the chancery of the British consulate, attested by the consul James
Bruce, in which it was specifically stated that Hayes would be obliged to
«fully execute [Xeno’s] orders»29. By another sworn attestation, again
by Peter Cruise (in English), Xeno’s claim that Hayes had tried to sell
the ship’s cables and anchors as a precursor to intentionally wrecking
it for insurance purposes was proven30. The majority of the rest of
the documentation consists of various letters and attestations giving
weight to Xeno’s version of events. Exhibit «C» was a letter sent by
a Captain Antonio Gaibisso moored in Gibraltar, who had also been
employed in freighting grain to Algiers. The document, attested by
the Genoese consul in Gibraltar, Don Bartolomeo Dagnino, confirmed
that the weather had been bad during Hayes’s arrival in Mahdiya, and
that «the aforementioned desperate entry [over the harbour barrier]
was disapproved of by all, [he] not having received the permission of
the King of Morocco nor of his charterer to enter»31. A letter from
Hayes to Xeno claimed that Salha Reis had deemed the ship in an un-
fit condition, saying that «we are too heavy to leave from this port,
and gave orders not to load any more», with Hayes claiming that «the
wheat weighs so much that it pushes the boat down [into the water]»32.
What is particularly interesting about much of this correspondence,
particularly that of Hayes to Xeno, is the language that is used, which
seems to be a form of lingua franca, heavily influenced by Spanish,
perhaps an example of «la bastarda lengua» of Don Qixote fame33.
The vocabulary shows a wide range of influences, including Spanish,
Italian, Catalan, and French, as well as non-standard grammar, was a
product of Western Mediterranean interculturality, used in this case
between a Briton and an Ottoman Greek shipping from Morocco to
Algiers34.
Returning to our narrative, a declaration sent from Salé in Morocco,
signed by a Pietro Suchitta and, in Arabic, an ʿAbd al-Sadiq and the
Moroccan agent, Muhammad Ben-Taleb, (their names prefaced by a
simple kataba, «thus wrote», with Ben-Taleb using the title, al-ḥājj)
contradicted Hayes’s letter by claiming that the ship had been laden
in the proper manner («cariceatta [sic] nella dovuta forma»)35. This
statement was attested by the Dutch consul in Salé, Fransisco Rossignol,
who also confirmed the validity of the «Moorish signatures» («las firmas
moriscos»). Nonetheless, having been told to move more quickly by
Xeno, Hayes wrote back and claimed that he was acting in conformity
to the contract, but that the ship had not taken on this much water
with a cargo of 200 tons on a previous voyage from Gibraltar to Villa
Franca36.
A number of letters written at around the same time further tried to
build evidence for his story, including false claims that he had travelled
to Salé over twenty times to try to get a pilot to leave Mahdiya, accusing
the pilot Salha Reis of trying to extort a hundred zecchini (gold coins)
from him for the service37. He also tried at this early stage to pick apart
the contract, claiming that «my contract says to lade on the coast of
Salé… it does not say at the barrier of Mahdiya»38. The charter-party
says quite the opposite, with the first article of the English version
specifically stating that the captain was obliged
to navigate… to the eastward, to the westward, to the right hand and to the
left, within and without the Mediterranean… and to go to all those ports and
scales which shall be required by the factors or commissarys of the freighter
or by his supercago who may be appointed by them, and such places and
ports and understood to be practicable, and to which other ships have usually
resorted or repaired39.
There was no mention of Salé as the sole destination; Hayes seems
to be referring to a letter sent by Cruise, attached to the charter-party,
that simply stated that he had «no interest in the affreightment of your
ship for her present intended voyage to the coast of Sally further, than
to oblige my friends Messrs Lefroy & Charron of Leghorn and Signor
Giovanni Xeno»40. Hayes therefore selectively chose elements from the
agreement and correspondence in order to undermine Xeno’s authority
and credibility.
More than this, an extracted record from the chancery of the British
consulate in Algiers notes that Salha Reis, the sultan of Morocco’s pilot,
arrived in Algiers as the captain of a Moroccan corsair ship in February
1765, giving a full account of Hayes’s refusal to use his services and
leave Mahdiya41. Moreover, in his letter to Bruce at the end of August
1764, falsely claiming to be in Salé, Hayes announced his intention to
«stop in Gibraltar but twenty four hours» before going on to Algiers,
before noting that «my charterparty is finished with my freighters last
month, and Mr Xeno will neither pay me or give me bill for my freight,
for which was obliged to protest against him and hold him and others
responsible to me for it»42. Another examination of the charter-party
agreement, which was dated 24 December 1763, gives the duration of
the voyage as «for four months certain, and three months uncertain»43.
In this respect, then, Hayes was right, with the term of the contract
at the end of July; however, the delay was due to Hayes’s refusal to
leave Mahdiya, as Xeno would argue. With all of this evidence, Xeno
had presented a number of clear facts to the Court: that Hayes had
contractually agreed to follow his orders; that Hayes had recklessly
entered the harbour of Mahdiya, and then refused to leave when told
to by Xeno and Salha Reis; that Hayes had lied about the ship being
overburdened, and not having assistance to leave the port; and that it
was Hayes’s fault that the voyage was delayed past the contractual date,
not Xeno’s.
In fighting off the claims of Hayes that he was owed money for the
uncompleted voyage, Xeno therefore had very strong evidence to sup-
port his case and defend himself against Hayes’s allegations. However,
the judge of the Gibraltar Vice-Admiralty Court, Hew Craig, thought
differently. In a five page ruling given on 20 September 1764, Craig
decided that the entire case essentially depended on whether or not
the extended stay of the Experiment at Mahdiya was the fault of Hayes
or of Xeno. Early on in his judgement, Craig declared that the ship
«remained in the River of Mamora [the Sebou River] under the direc-
tions of the Respondent [Xeno] from the seventh day of March last…
until the third day of September instant»44. Therefore, all of Xeno’s
proofs relating to Hayes’s conduct, signed and attested by naval cap-
tains, consuls, and merchants, meant nothing; Hayes’s account won the
day. Consequently, Xeno was given two options: either pay Hayes what
he was owed under the current charter-party and enter in a new agree-
ment to ensure that the grain was freighted to Algiers; or, if payment
was not forthcoming, Xeno would be forced to surrender the cargo for
it to be sold by public auction to pay off the debt. Xeno, protesting
the judgement, refused to pay, and consequently the grain was seized
to be sold off.
Feeling aggrieved, Xeno began a form of appeals process to ensure
that the cargo was sold fairly and openly, and that the monies would be
distributed by the Court in accordance with Craig’s ruling. However,
Hayes spirited off with most of the cargo to sell for his own profit. Xeno
wrote a memorial to the Court demanding a copy of the certificates
of sale for the public auction, but none were forthcoming45. Xeno’s
concern was based on an accusation made by Hayes that the value of
the cargo was «not being sufficient to render one fourth part of the
import of the freight due to him», and was suspicious that he was being
swindled again; after all, the grain was supposed to be sold in Gibraltar
by public auction, not taken by Hayes to sell on his own account46. Non-
etheless, Hayes left Gibraltar without leaving any documentation, but
a number of documents within the legal bundle show the fate of some
of this cargo47. A statement from one Giuseppe Mortedo in Gibraltar –
attested by the Genoese consul, Bartholomeo Danino – recorded that
he had loaded a shipment of grain sold by the Experiment, and took
it to be sold along the Spanish coast, with 190 fanegas (equivalent to
about fifty-five litres) sold in Ercia for 40 reales de vellón per fanega, 63
fanegas sold in Almuñecar for 44 reales de vellón per fangea, and a fur-
ther 142 fanegas sold in Jurago at 37 reales de vellón per fanega, a total
of 395 fanegas (over 21,700 litres) of grain bringing in the significant
sum of 15,626 reales de vellón48. A second statement from Gibraltar,
this time from one Angelo Palmaro, a major dealer in grain who sold
part of the cargo of the Experiment in Malaga for 37 reales de vellón
per fanega49.
Hayes had therefore taken part of the grain and sold it in Spain
himself, rather than relying on the public auction ordered by Craig.
As well as gathering information on the price the grain was being sold
for, Xeno also sought out testimony over its quality, which Hayes had
called into question, and the public auction in Gibraltar had seem part
of the grain sold – to Hayes’s co-conspirators Butler and Murphey –
as damaged corn. However, two merchants resident in Gibraltar, the
Genoese Giovanni Battista Vasado and the Livornese Giovanni Man-
zani, who had inspected the grain held by the Experiment, attested
that the grain was «completely dry» (asciuto tottalmente), of a «good
quality» (buona qualità), and, moreover, that Hayes «did not unload
all of the cargo but rather left it in the hold, and a great part of the
grain was left inside the ship», following which he sailed for Malaga
from the middle of October to the beginning of November in 176450.
Moreover, Xeno produced a very important document from the start
of the loading of the grain in Mahdiya in May 1764, which is tran-
scribed in full on the following page with a translation from the Itali-
an provided51. Hayes and Xeno used a standard form of document, a
polizza di mare, that was used, with slight variations depending on place,
by merchants of all description across the Mediterranean and beyond
in this period. Theirs came from Livorno, but the name of that port
was simply crossed out and replaced with Mamora (Mahdiya). This
small little piece of paper proves that the cargo had been in a good
condition when it was put on board the Experiment, and that Hayes
agreed that the cargo would reach its destination «dry, complete, and
in a good condition». Despite a disclaimer written by Hayes in his usu-
al lingua franca that he did not know the true weight and contents of
the goods he was carrying – a standard disclaimer, given that he had
not personally measured and inspected the goods – he agreed that the
cargo was in good condition when it went on his ship. This is also a
nice example of a document being used outside of its intended area of
jurisdiction, with the formula it provided recognised as being as valid
for a British and Ottoman merchant lading goods in Morocco bound
for Algiers as it was for Livornese merchants, meaning, presumably,
that it spoke to a generally acknowledged customary framework of doc-
umentation.
As a final piece of evidence to show the criminality of Hayes’s ac-
tions, Xeno secured the testimony of a number of merchants in Livorno,
sealed with the official seal of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, giving
details of the fluctuations in the price of grain sold between 1 January
and 1 April 1765, and demonstrating that Hayes had not got the best
possible price for the grain he sold52. All of these factors together –
Hayes delaying the departure from Mahdiya before taking the cargo
to Gibraltar contrary to the contracted agreement, Craig ordering the
cargo to be sold to pay the freighting charges for an incomplete voyage,
and Hayes taking most of the cargo and selling it for his own profit
in Spain – gave Xeno the confidence, backed by his mound of legal
proofs, to petition King George III to seek justice for his losses. Indeed,
the final exhibit in his case file, labelled «AA», provides a detail of
his losses, amounting to 5,668 Algerian zecchini in lost capital, and a
further 2,267 zecchini in expenses incurred on legal, travel, and living
costs between September 1764 and August 1765 caused by «the unjust
sentence» (la ingiusta sentenza) passed by Craig53.
xImplications of the case
One question poses itself quite clearly from this whole mess. At
the beginning of Craig’s judgement, he had given Xeno two options:
either to pay Hayes the money owed, or that the cargo would be taken
as security for the debt and sold if necessary. Why could the cargo
not simply act as a security until its arrival at Algiers? During his ini-
tial case at the Gibraltar court, Xeno had offered to pay 400 zecchini
of his own money towards the supposed debt in order to show good
faith, with the rest of the cargo acting as security until the completion
of the voyage in Algiers. This was refused by Craig, and he seized
Xeno’s money and deposited it with the Court to avoid Xeno trying
to offer it again. Craig provided a further narrative to his judgement
that explains why this would not be possible. First, he saw the corn
not as the property of Ben-Taleb or of ʿAli Hoca, but of Charron &
Lefroy through Cruise, meaning that he saw Xeno’s role not as su-
percargo, bus as «the person who procur’d leave to load in Barbary,
such licenses being often produc’d by Moors or Jews»54. He sided with
Hayes’s version of events, that the cargo was too much for the ship to
carry, meaning that it was not his fault that the departure from Mahdiya
was delayed.
The most telling revelation, however, comes with his third observa-
tion. Craig reported that Ben-Taleb had written from Tetouan to the
governor of Gibraltar, General Cornwallis, proposing to arrange pay-
ment of security via a Mr Pariente, a Jewish resident of Gibraltar act-
ing as Ben-Taleb’s agent, to be witnessed by Cruise and Hayes’s busi-
ness associate Francis Butler and a Moroccan envoy passing through
the town, but the scheme fell through. The reason given by Craig was
that «the security of a Moor residing in Barbary being refus’d by the
Plaintiff, was not thought sufficient or responsible to the Judge», and
that he did not wish to refuse «a British subject what appear’d to him
[Craig] and in the opinion of the merchants of Cadiz and Gibraltar
to be his just right»55. Here, we are not dealing with a case based on
legal proof, but on the judge’s decision that Ben-Taleb’s security was
not sufficient, despite his great wealth and international connections
simply because he was a «Moor», that Hayes’s account was more con-
vincing than Xeno’s despite his significant documentation, and that he
had interpreted the charter-party as being a contract between Hayes
and Cruise on behalf of Lefroy & Charron, rather than acknowledging
Cruise’s own statement registered in the British consulate in Algiers
that the hire of the ship had been made solely on the order of Xeno56.
This seems to be an example of a judge making his ruling along national
lines to protect a national interest, rather than following legal processes
based on documentation and impartiality.
Reflecting on Xeno’s case, consul James Bruce wrote that «I have
heard that by our laws, even the strongest conviction of a judge is not to
sway him in time of trial where all is to be determined by evidence»57.
Clearly, Craig made a conscious decision not to favour Xeno’s case,
based on his prejudice towards the reliability of North African mer-
chants and his concern of ruling against a British merchant in favour
of an Ottoman subject. Whilst I have unbeen able to find much de-
tail on Craig himself, Stephen Constantine’s study on the history of
Gibraltar shows the importance of British privateering to the town’s
economy, and so it is not inconceivable to imagine Craig condemning a
North African shipment for economic benefit58. Yet beyond prejudice
or conviction, there is also the question of legal basis. No law was cited
in his judgement, be it admiralty or state, and no legal methodology
was presented. In part, I suspect, this is due to a lack of familiarity on
Xeno’s part with the British legal system, but also due to the lack of
Ottoman or Algerian diplomatic representation to protect mercantile
interests. Given that Xeno was a resident of Algiers freighting goods on
behalf of ʿAli Hoca, a major Algerian merchant who also worked for
the Dey, it is not unreasonable to suppose that some care might have
been taken to examine the treaties between Algiers and Britain. Had
this treaty been taken into account, then a number of infractions would
have appeared. For instance, article 14 of the 1686 version of the treaty,
which continued into later agreements, specifically that:
English text: No captain or commander of any ship or vessel belonging
to his said majesty’s subjects shall be obliged against his will to take any
goods, to carry them, or make a voyage to any place he shall not have a
mind to go to: And neither the English consul nor any other subjects of
the said king shall be bound to pay the debts of any other of his majesty’s
subjects, except that he or they become sureties for the same, by a publick
act.
Ottoman text: Moreover, [the subjects of Algiers] may not consign [Brit-
ish ships] on journeys if it is not with their own consent; and moreover, if
any of the British subjects, whether it is the British consul or any other, is
a debtor, and there is not a surety for the payment of the debt, the debt of
the aforesaid may not be paid by [the Algerians] transferring the debt to
another person; if it appears to be voluntary, a number of individuals can
act as surety for the debt59.
And if the British authorities wanted to treat Xeno by his origins
and go by the Ottoman Capitulations rather than the Algerian treaties,
they would have found a very similar article (number 4 by the Ottoman
reckoning and 8 by the British) on the subject of debts:
English text: If any Englishman, either for his own debt, or for his surety-
ship, shall absent himself, or make escape away, or shall be bankrupt, the
creditor shall only pretend his debt upon his own debtor, and not of any
other English; and if the creditor have not authenick Hoget or Bill of Surety-
ship made by an Englishman, he shall not pretend his debt of any other
Englishman.
Ottoman text: If one of the British debtors or guarantors flees or becomes
bankrupt, the obligation of the debtor can be demanded. In taking legal
action, if there is not a guarantor together with a legal proof holding another
person [responsible], the said debt may not be demanded from another60.
Algerian and Ottoman treaties with Britain made it very clear
that ships should not be taken on voyages without the express
consent of their owners and passengers, and that individuals could
not be responsible for the debts of others. Although these articles
speak specifically about rights accorded to British subjects, reciprocity
was to be inferred, especially in the Algerian treaty that was more
explicitly bilateral. As such, by taking ʿAli Hoca’s cargo and Xeno
to Gibraltar without their permission, and by confiscating Xeno’s
money and making him personally responsible for the payment of
the freighting charges, Hayes and Craig were going against the spirit,
if not the letter, of the British commercial agreements with Algiers
and the Ottoman Empire designed to ensure peaceful commerce.
Such a legal background gives an extra degree of urgency to Xeno’s
declaration to the Gibraltar admiralty court, that «having been brought
to this place by the said captain [Hayes] against the course of
his voyage and against his will, [Xeno] comes to interrogate the
said captain by the means of this Court, for the release of the
ship, and for the completion of his voyage»61. However, despite
petitioning the British monarch and seeking justice for many years
after the events of 1764 and 1765, Giovanni Xeno never found
justice.
Taking a microhistiorical approach to the question of the leg-
al proofs of Ottoman merchants, and particularly North African
merchants, in European courts, of course presents some problems.
With Xeno’s case so unusual in the quantity of documentation pre-
served and its complicated and convoluted nature, any temptations
to draw more general conclusions must be tempered. Further com-
parative case studies are needed, particularly with a view to examin-
ing the different sorts of documentation involved. However, if we
are to take economic spaces as relational spaces, defined by habitu-
al and customary practices as Wolfgang Kaiser has proposed, then
cases such as this are important examples of what happens when
voyages are interrupted, and when the motivations of the practition-
ers of economic activities, commercial and legal, do not act as they
ought62. Xeno, an Ottoman Greek, was navigating a complex com-
mercial and legal space, travelling from (not really very Ottoman)
Algiers to Moroccan Mahdiya to British Gibraltar, working on be-
half of an Algerian and a Moroccan freighting wheat on a ship cap-
tained by an Irish subject of Britain under the auspices of a Brit-
ish resident of Algiers and a British trading house in Livorno. In
gathering his legal evidence, he compiled papers in Italian, Eng-
lish, Spanish, and Arabic, witnessed by British, Dutch, and Gen-
oese consuls and bringing the testimony of Moroccans, Genoese,
Livornese, Gibraltarians, and British together to construct a ro-
bust legal defence. The documentation he provided was standard-
ised, with statements sworn by set phrases such as attestiamo con
nostro giuramento («we attest by our oath») and witnessed by im-
portant legal figures in the consuls, and the use and adaptation
of the Livornese bill of lading demonstrates that these proofs as
objects circulated around the Mediterranean, widely accepted and
widely used. This, then, is the world in which Xeno was a small
but integral part, multi-lingual, legally plural, and intensely intercon-
nected.
What part, then, do the Vice-Admiralty Court at Gibraltar and
individuals like Hayes and Craig play in such a world? Hayes, with
his debts across the Mediterranean, attempted insurance fraud, and
falsification of documents and narratives, represents a merchant, of
which doubtless there were many, attempting to use the complexity of
this commercial space against his fellow traders. He saw opportunities,
not least with the grain over which Xeno meant to keep watch, and used
them to his advantage. Craig, however, perhaps represents something
quite different. In defending his ruling, he claimed that «if any error has
been committed by him during the course of this affair, it will appear
not intentional, and will be imputed an error of the head and not of
the heart»63. Yet, clearly, his judgment was made precisely on instinct
and prejudice, of the heart rather than the head. The head would have
understood that major mercantile players ʿAli Hoca would have been
perfectly capable of paying Hayes’s freighting costs in Algiers, that the
evidence presented by Xeno taken from a wide range of sources shows
that he was blameless for the delay at Mahdiya and was undermined by
Hayes, and that, at the very least, the public auction of Xeno’s cargo
should have been held openly. It was the heart that took Xeno’s 400
zecchini to avoid a swift resolution of the case, that judged the surety of
a «Moor» merchant not «sufficient» or «responsible», and that refused
to acknowledge the strength of the legal case presented by Xeno.
More than this, there was an absence of legal principle. Not only did
Craig ignore the multiple assertions in the charter-party agreement that
Hayes was bound to obey Xeno’s commands, he also ignored the wads
of evidence testifying that Hayes had indeed ignored Xeno’s instruc-
tions by not allowing Salha Reis to take the ship out of Mahdiya, and by
going to Gibraltar rather than to Algiers. This is where Xeno’s world
hits a brick wall. Were this case reversed, and a British plaintiff taking
an Algerian respondent to court over a commercial dispute in Algiers,
the case would have been heard by the dey’s divan with the consul in
attendance, in accordance with the provisions of the Algerian-British
treaty. With no Algerian or Ottoman consuls in Gibraltar, and no at-
tempt by the British authorities to consider treaty obligations, Algerian
or Ottoman, Xeno was stuck. This, perhaps, raises the most significant
issue brought out by this episode. For Craig, it was more important that
a British subject secured justice in a British court, than it was for an
Ottoman subject to have his proofs considered fairly, and, what is more,
he could choose this course of action with impunity; Algerian warships
were not likely to wreak fiery vengeance against Gibraltar in the 1760s,
and Bruce’s voice of dismay seems to have been a lone one. Without
the protective net provided by consular networks ensuring the fair ap-
plication of legal principles and articles found in commercial treaties,
pluralistic commercial practices would find themselves challenged by
monolithic judicial (or not so judicial) authorities and monochromatic
national interest.
FIG. 2. The Bill of Lading between Xeno and Hayes (handwritten text in italics).
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